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PAUL VERKUIL'S PROJECTS FOR THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.
1974-1992
Jeffrey S. Lubbers*
INTRODUCTION

I am really happy to be part of this tribute to Paul Verkuil. It may
surprise those in the audience to learn that I am bringing some needed
diversity to today's proceedings-I am the only other Dutch American
on the program! But perhaps my twenty years at the "Administrative
Conference" also qualifies me to say a few words about how thrilled I
am that we have it back-"ACUS 2.0" we can call it, complete with a
website this time'-and that Paul is at its helm. And I want to thank
Paul for bringing me back to the ACUS team as a Special Counsel.
I am not ordinarily a believer in divine intervention, or even karma,
but it must have been something like that when just at the time the
Administrative Conference finally achieved funding to start up again
after a fourteen-year hiatus, 2 Paul Verkuil was also just ending his oneyear stint as Acting Dean at the University of Miami School of Law and
was therefore available for the ACUS Chairmanship. Many of us who
followed the long rebirth of ACUS urged the powers-that-be in the
White House to consider Paul for that post because he combined such a
perfect blend of administrative law scholarship, proven leadership of
many great institutions, and a bi-partisan approach to issues that was
tailor-made for ACUS. President Obama heard these messages and
announced his intent to nominate Paul on November 2, 2009. And it is
a testament to his stature that, even in this age of Senate holds and
* Professor of Practice in Administrative Law, Washington College of Law, American
University. Formerly staff attorney (1975-1982) and Research Director (1982-1995) of the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS); currently Special Counsel to the
(revived) ACUS.
1 See ADMIN. CONF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
2 The first attempt to revive ACUS occurred in 2004 when Congress enacted the Federal
Regulatory Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-401, 118 Stat. 2255, which reauthorized
the ACUS. Unfortunately, however, the authorized appropriations were not made for fiscal years
2005-2007. So in 2008, Congress again reauthorized ACUS in the Regulatory Improvement Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-290, 122 Stat. 2914 (2008). This time appropriations were made for
fiscal years 2009-2011, but use of these appropriations had to await the nomination and
confirmation of the ACUS Chairman.
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partisan confirmation fights, Paul was approved by the Judiciary
Committee without a hearing, and was unanimously confirmed on the
Senate consent calendar on March 3, 2010.
What made this even more appropriate was that Paul was returning
to head an agency that he had served at the very beginning of his
academic career, and one that had served as a forum for some of his
most enduring works of scholarship. I am going to devote my remarks
to those works.
His overall body of work covers the core issues of administrative
law-adjudication, rulemaking, and judicial review, while also
commenting on specific areas of concern in the world of government
administration such as immigration, mass adjudication, and outsourcing.
His take on administrative procedure is classical-let us try to improve
it by focusing on efficiency, fairness, and acceptability-and it is a nice
blend of theory and practice.
I will discuss his ACUS works in chronological order. My own
first knowledge of Paul's work came when I was a fledgling
administrative law instructor at the University of Miami School of Law
in the spring of 1975-trying to get a class of night students excited
about the Kenneth Culp Davis textbook (which I had learned from
myself two years earlier at Chicago). I was having rough sledding (if I
can say that about Miami) until I discovered the Problem Supplement
for the Gellhorn and Byse casebook co-written by a young assistant
professor at the University of North Carolina named Paul Verkuil. 3 The
lively problems in that little volume saved the day for me in that class.
I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INFORMAL RULEMAKING

Paul had just completed his first project for ACUS about that time.
He was recruited by Chairman Scalia to take up the hottest issue of the
day in 1973-the "search for the appropriate scope of review of
informal rulemaking." 4 The age of rulemaking was dawning and the
courts, especially the high caliber judges on the D.C. Circuit, were
wrestling with the appropriate approach for reviewing agency rules in a
pre-enforcement context-a practice that had only recently been greenlighted by the Supreme Court's Abbott Laboratoriesdecision in 1966.5
Reviewing courts were used to reviewing agency formal adjudications
on the basis of whether there was "substantial evidence" in the
"administrative record" to support the agency order, but the concept of a
3 wALTER GELLHORN, CLARK BYSE & PAUL R. VERKUIL, PROBLEMS FOR USE IN
CONJUNCTION WITH GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (6th ed. 1974).
4 Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review ofInfonnal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 185 (1974).

5 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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"record" in rulemaking seemed inapt-especially since "on-the-record
rulemaking" connoted the disfavored category of "formal rulemaking"
that had just been whittled down by the Court in the FloridaEast Coast
case. 6
In its discussions of "informal," notice-and-comment rulemaking,
the Supreme Court seemed to be unsure of itself at this point. In its
1971 Overton Park decision, 7 which was a disquisition on the
appropriate scope of review of informal adjudication-the arbitrary and
capricious test-the Court included what Paul called an "unfortunate
dictum suggesting that the substantial evidence test should apply to
informal rulemaking," 8 a dictum that was seemingly applied a year later
in another rulemaking case, United States v. Midwest Video Corp.9 A

year after that, in another informal adjudication case that had just come
down, Camp v. Pitts, the Court, in explaining why the arbitrary and
capricious test was applicable, used language that seemed to require its
application to informal rulemaking too:
[I]t is also clear that neither the National Bank Act nor the APA
requires the Comptroller to hold a hearing or to make formal findings
on the hearing record when passing on applications for new banking
authorities. Accordingly, the proper standard for judicial review of
the Comptroller's adjudications is not the "substantial evidence" test
which is appropriate when reviewing findings made on a hearing
record. 1
This was already the law in the D.C. Circuit, where since 1968 the court

had been applying the arbitrary and capricious test to informal
rulemaking-a view that finally was clearly accepted by the Supreme
Court in the 1983 State Farm case.I

Another question left open by the caselaw at the time Professor
Verkuil was recruited to look into this for ACUS was how exactly the
arbitrary and capricious test was to be applied. The Supreme Court
again seemed to be debating itself on this issue in Overton Park and
Camp v. Pitts. In Overton Park, the Court explained what the APA's

arbitrary and capricious test meant in the context of a challenge to an
6 United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
7 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
9 Verkuil, supra note 4, at 212.
9 406 U.S. 649, 671 (1972) ("The question remains whether the regulation is supported by
substantial evidence that it will promote the public interest.").
10 Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-41 (1973) (citations omitted).
I1 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
40-41 (1983) ("[W]e do not find the appropriate scope of judicial review to be the 'most
troublesome question' in the case.... [M]otor vehicle safety standards are to be promulgated
under the informal rulemaking procedures of § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The
agency's action in promulgating such standards therefore may be set aside if found to be
'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."' (citing
Overton Park and the APA)).

2424

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:6

order made in an informal adjudication. It said: "To make this finding
the court must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment."l 2 By way of further explanation, it said, somewhat
contradictorily: "Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching
and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court
is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."' 3
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing, seemingly departing from its famous Morgan IV
dictum that it is normally impermissible to "probe the mental processes
of the Secretary"l 4:
Thus it is necessary to remand this case to the District Court for
plenary review of the Secretary's decision. That review is to be
based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary
at the time he made his decision. But since the bare record may not
disclose the factors that were considered or the Secretary's
construction of the evidence it may be necessary for the District
Court to require some explanation in order to determine if the
Secretary acted within the scope of his authority and if the
Secretary's action was justifiable under the applicable standard.
The court may require the administrative officials who
participated in the decision to give testimony explaining their action.
Of course, such inquiry into the mental processes of administrative
decisionmakers is usually to be avoided.' 5
Two concurring Justices would have sent the case directly back to the
agency for a reasoned decisionl 6-a view that was ultimately borne out
when the district court, after twenty-five days of "plenary hearing,"
determined that a remand to the agency was required.' 7
In Camp v. Pitts, on the other hand, the Court bent over backwards
to avoid further evidence-taking by the lower courts. Despite an
administrative record that was almost as flimsy as the one provided by
the agency in Overton Park, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit's order requiring an evidentiary hearing in the district court,
which was consistent with the Supreme Court's remand order in
Overton Park. In Camp, however, the Supreme Court ruled:
The validity of the Comptroller's action must, therefore, stand or fall
on the propriety of [his] finding, judged, of course, by the
appropriate standard of review. If that finding is not sustainable on
12 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
13 Id

14 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
15 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420 (footnote and citation omitted) (citing Morgan, 313 U.S.
409).
16 Id. at 421 (Black & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
17 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Tenn.
1972).
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the administrative record made, then the Comptroller's decision must
be vacated and the matter remanded to him for further
consideration. 18
Is it any wonder that Professor Verkuil, writing when these decisions
were fresh, wrote: "One questions whether the Court has devised a
coherent scheme of review of rules enacted pursuant to informal
rulemaking"? 19
Congress, for its part, was also clouding up this issue by enacting
some major rulemaking statutes with a specification that the substantial
evidence test be used on judicial review. And as the locus of most
reviews of agency rules, the D.C. Circuit had to figure out how to
review these rules. 20
This is where some great minds did not think alike-even though
politically they were all New Deal Democrats. 21 On one side there was
Chief Judge David Bazelon, who felt that judges were experts on
procedure, not on the substance of regulation, and wanted the courts to
ensure that agencies used the procedures necessary to make the best
decision. On the other side were Judges Harold Leventhal and Skelly
Wright, who felt that mandating additional procedures would force
agencies to err on the side of over-proceduralization and ultimately slow
down the rulemaking process-what we call "ossification" today. 22
They believed that judges should examine and try to understand the
technical matters at issue in order to determine whether the agency has
exercised reasoned discretion.
Even before Overton Park, Judge Leventhal had used the term
"hard look" to describe his approach to review. He wrote in 1970 that
"[the judiciary's] supervisory function calls on the court to
intervene .. . if the court becomes aware ... that the agency has not
really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely
engaged in reasoned decision-making." 23 In his ACUS report, Paul was
18 Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973).
19 Verkuil, supra note 4, at 214.
20 For an illuminating history of rulemaking's "collision" "with vigorous judicial review" in
the D.C. Circuit, see Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal
Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1139, 1141 (2001). See also Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., "History Belongs to the Winners ": The Bazelon-Leventhal Debate and the
Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action,

58 ADMIN. L. REv. 995 (2006).
21 Schiller points out that: "Judges Bazelon, Wright, and Leventhal were all products of PostWar liberalism. Each graduated from law school during the New Deal, served in the Roosevelt or
Truman administration, and was placed on the federal bench by a Democratic president."
Schiller, supra note 20, at 1185.
22 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DuKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47

ADMIN. L. REv. 59 (1995).
23 Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (licensing case);
see also Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (rulemaking case)
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one of the first to pick up on the importance of this phrase, when he
explained: "This 'hard look' doctrine has been used to examine the
record for agency reactions to presentations made by participants in the
rulemaking and to eliminate the possibility that the agency has relied
upon a 'crystal ball' to resolve tough questions." 24 In that regard he
may have been the first to refer to the "hard look doctrine," other than
Judge Leventhal himself.25
Just as Paul was undertaking his research, Judge Leventhal, who
was an active participant in the Administrative Conference Committee
on Judicial Review that considered this project, put his views into
practice in two 1973 cases involving EPA rulemaking. In International
Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 26 Judge Leventhal (along with Judge
Tamm) upheld a technical EPA rule concerning auto emission
requirements, and in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,27 he
overturned an EPA rule that limited stationary source emissions by
cement plants. In each decision he wrote a lengthy analysis of the
scientific and engineering aspects of the rule. He wrote: "While we
remain diffident in approaching problems of this technical complexity,
the necessity to review agency decisions, if it is to be more than a
meaningless exercise, requires enough steeping in technical matters to
determine whether the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion." 28
Judge Bazelon concurred in InternationalHarvester,but disagreed
with the majority's approach to the review. He said:
Socrates said that wisdom is the recognition of how much one does
not know. I may be wise if that is wisdom, because I recognize that I
do not know enough about dynamometer extrapolations,
deterioration factor adjustments, and the like to decide whether or
not the government's approach to these matters was statistically
valid. 29
Shortly after this, Judges Leventhal, Wright, and Bazelon took to the
law reviews to write articles defending their points of view.30

("What counts is the reality of an opportunity to submit an effective presentation, to assure that
the Secretary and his assistants will take a hard look at the problems in the light of those
submissions.").
24 Verkuil, supra note 4, at 238.
25 See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.

PA. L. REv. 509, 514 (1974) (referring to the "hard look doctrine").
26 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
27 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
28 Id. at 402 (citing Int'l Harvester, 478 F.2d at 647); see also Schiller, supra note 20, at

1156-57 (describing these cases).
29 Int'lHarvester, 478 F.2d at 650-51 (Bazelon, J., concurring).
30 See Schiller, supra note 20, at 1162-66 (citing David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology

Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 817 (1977); Leventhal, supra note 25; J. Skelly
Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits ofJudicial Review, 59 CORNELL L.

REv. 375 (1974)).
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We all know what happened next-the Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. decision came

down squarely against the Bazelon approach. 3 ' The case concerned a
challenge to a rulemaking by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that
had been designed to help the agency avoid having time-consuming
adjudicatory hearings on the environmental impact of nuclear power
plants in every licensing proceeding. Environmental groups challenged
the rulemaking, and the D.C. Circuit overturned it. Chief Judge
Bazelon's opinion for the court held that the NRC needed to provide
opponents of the rule with some opportunity to challenge the testimony
of the agency's experts, and remanded the rule. 32
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. In his opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, citing Judge Wright's article, said that the D.C.
Circuit's "Monday morning quarterbacking" 33 of the rulemaking
process would cause agencies to err on the side of formal procedures
and that "all the inherent advantages of informal rulemaking would be
totally lost." 34 The upshot of course is that after this decision courts
may not require agencies to use procedures in rulemaking beyond those
required by the APA or other statute. But hard look review of agency
fact finding and policy choice under the arbitrary and capricious test
survives, as we saw in the 1983 State Farm decision, most recently
reaffirmed by the Fox TV Stations case. 35
This all seems quite familiar now, but in 1974 it was all new and
uncertain. The result of Paul's work was ACUS Recommendation 74-4,
"Preenforcement Judicial Review of Rules of General Applicability," 36
which made several important clarifying contributions to the developing
administrative law doctrine. First, it detailed the appropriate contents of
what later became known as the "rulemaking record" in pre-

31 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
32 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 641
(D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Aeschliman v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (consolidated case).
33 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 547.
34 Id.

35 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) (asserting that while the
standard of review under the arbitrary and capricious test is "narrow," ".weinsist that an agency
'examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action"'). But see Am.
Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("Application of the beefed-up
arbitrary-and-capricious test is inevitably if not inherently unpredictable-so much so that, on
occasion, the courts' arbitrary-and-capricious review itself appears arbitrary and capricious.").
36 39 Fed. Reg. 23,041, 23,044 (June 26, 1974). ACUS Recommendations are available at
ADMIN. CONF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov (last visited June 19, 2011), with a link to the
compilation

at

ABA

ADMIN.

PROC.

DATABASE,

acus/acustoc.html (last visited June 19, 2011).

http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/
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enforcement judicial review, 37 while also taking pains to acknowledge
that in some cases courts might supplement the record or even exclude
certain parts due to confidentiality concerns.
Second, it approved of the use of the arbitrary and capricious test
as the appropriate test for judicial review of rules issued after informal
rulemaking proceedings and suggested:
The term "substantial evidence on the record as a whole," or
comparable language, in statutes authorizing judicial review should
not, in and of itself, be taken by agencies or courts as implying that
any particular procedures must be followed by the agency whose
actions are subject to the statute and, in particular, should not be
taken as a legislative prescription that in rulemaking agencies must
follow procedures in addition to those specified in 5 U.S.C. 553.38
I view this as one of ACUS's foundational recommendations that
is as relevant today as it was forward-looking then. One of ACUS's
most exacting members, Warner Gardner, wrote a letter at the time to
then-Research Director Robert Hamilton about Paul's article: "It is a
very thoughtful and comprehensive job. He has made more intelligible
an area of much difficulty and contradiction, and offers the reader a
framework in which to arrange the somewhat chaotic cases." 39 And
Bill Allen, Chairman of the ACUS Committee on Judicial Review and
another stern taskmaster and stickler for well-written reports, began his
introduction of the matter at the May 1974 ACUS Plenary Session with
these remarks: "[I]f there is anything of real value in what the Judicial
Review Committee brings before you today, it is principally the Verkuil
report, which I commend to all of you for careful reading. It is full of
intelligent analysis, and insights into this new and fascinating
problem." 40 Obviously this was a great launch to Paul's academic
career.

37 ACUS Recommendation No. 74-4, 39 Fed. Reg. at 23,044, 1 ("(1) The notice of
proposed rulemaking and any documents referred to therein; (2) comments and other documents
submitted by interested persons; (3) any transcripts of oral presentations made in the course of the
rulemaking; (4) factual information not included in the foregoing that was considered by the
authority responsible for promulgation of the rule or that is proffered by the agency as pertinent to
the rule; (5) reports of any advisory committees; and (6) the agency's concise general statement
or final order and any documents referred to therein.").
38 Id.

2.

39 Letter from Warner W. Gardner to Robert W. Hamilton (Apr. 4, 1974) (on file in project
file for ACUS Recommendation 74-4).
40 Transcript of ACUS Plenary Session 147 (May 31, 1974).
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II.

STUDY ON INFORMAL ADJUDICATION

Paul's second ACUS study, of informal adjudication procedures, 41
did not result in a recommendation, but in my opinion is one of the most
useful administrative law articles ever written. Although written thirtyfour years ago, I still assign it to my administrative law class, even
though I could have hardly imagined reading an article written in 1939
when I was in law school. Why is it so useful? Because it illuminates
an area of the law, informal adjudication, that is almost unaddressed in
the APA and it ties it in to the caselaw on procedural due process that
still reigns today.
Because the APA formal adjudication procedures are only
triggered by statutes that require "on-the-record" hearings, and because
Congress often, deliberately or not, omits such language in programs
that require adjudications, a vast number of informal adjudication
programs exist throughout the government. 42 Moreover, because the
APA lacks a section on informal adjudication and contains only a
smattering of provisions that apply to informal adjudication, agencies
are free to design their own procedures subject to the constraints of the
Due Process Clause and any restrictions in their own statutes. It is
obviously difficult to maintain a perspective on this wide variety of
programs and procedures.
What Paul did was hit on an ingenious way of describing them. He
first extracted the ten procedural ingredients of the pre-termination
hearing required by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly before
welfare benefits could be terminated. 43 These ten ingredients basically
make up the recipe for a trial-type hearing similar to the APA's formal
He then chose four Cabinet departments
adjudication process.
(Agriculture, Commerce HUD, and Interior) and catalogued all of the
informal adjudication programs in them, amounting to forty-two. Next,
he compared the procedural ingredients of each program to the
Goldbergv. Kelly ten. He found a wide range: two had all ten, four had
nine, two had eight, four had seven, one had six, one had five, nine had
four, thirteen had three, three had two, two had zero. 44
He also investigated how often each of the procedures were
present: Of the forty-two, forty offered timely and adequate notice, ten
41 Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U, CHI. L. REV. 739

(1976).
42 See generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication:

Is the Quest for Unformity

Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65 (1996).
43 See 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
44 See Verkuil, supra note 41, at 760-71. The totals are summarized id. at 760 n.80.
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allowed confrontation of adverse witnesses, twenty-one allowed oral
presentation of arguments, twelve allowed oral presentation of
evidence, nine permitted cross-examination, ten offered disclosure of
opposing evidence, sixteen allowed the right to retain an attorney, seven
provided a determination on the record of the hearing, thirty-seven
provided a statement of reasons for the determination and an indication
of the evidence relied on, and thirty-eight had an impartial decisionmaker.45

The numbers themselves are interesting, but the framework is what
makes the situation understandable to the students. And when the
students then read Mathews v. Eldridge,46 which substituted the famous
three-prong balancing test for determining what process is due under the
Due Process Clause in varying situations-a retrenchment from
Goldberg that had just been handed down as Paul published his
article-they can see just how the balancing test might work in various
contexts. Moreover, the article also forms a good foundation for
discussing whether it would be possible to draft an informal
adjudication section of the APA that could cover the multitude of such
adjudications.
So as a teaching tool, I find the article invaluable. But along the
way Paul provides some useful theoretical underpinnings for these
discussions, pointing out that the quest is to find the optimum balance of
fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction to the participants (sometimes
called "acceptability") in administrative proceedings. He also signals
one of his lifelong themes-encouraging interdisciplinary work
He points out in the
concerning government administration.
introduction to this article that the conflicts among the goals of
efficiency and fairness tend to "intensify when the government's
activity takes on critical importance to the individual." 47 In an
interesting footnote he explains that part of the reason for this
stems from the fact that each discipline of the social sciences is
inhibited from relating its own measures of individual behavior to
those of other disciplines. Thus, the economist's maximization
principle has not been coordinated with the sociologist's or
psychologist's satisfaction principle in any effective way. Much
interdisciplinary theorizing needs to be done if problems like those
addressed in this article are to be solved by the social sciences. 48
Paul's pathbreaking work in this area has not to my knowledge
really been updated or supplemented-perhaps because such an
endeavor is so arduous. But its searchlight still shines.
45 Id

46 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
47 Verkuil, supra note 41, at 742.
48 Id. at 742-43 n.13.
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III.

UNIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

Two years later in 1978, now the Dean of Tulane Law School, Paul
produced another pathbreaking article, The Emerging Concept of
Administrative Procedure.49 I wish I could claim this was an article for
the Administrative Conference. Truth be told, although it has been for
years mistakenly included in the ACUS bibliography,50 it was done for
the ABA's Commission on Law and the Economy. But I want to
mention it here, not only because of its sweeping attempt to synthesize
the APA procedures into a "unitary administrative procedure," 5 but
also because it made some specific recommendations on expanding
ACUS's role-a recommendation he may now be in a position to
implement.
In this article, he delves into the history of the APA to describe
how fears of administrative tyranny led anti-New Deal forces to nearly
enact the Walter Logan Act, which "under the guise of reform, would
force administrative and departmental agencies having a wide variety of
functions into a single mold which is so rigid, so needlessly interfering,
as to bring about a widespread crippling of the administrative
process." 52 With the help of the 1941 Attorney General's Committee
Report on Administrative Procedure, the compromise APA was
eventually enacted after WWII, and as Paul concludes,
the substance of the bill owed relatively little to Walter-Logan. It did
not impose a procrustean procedural system on administrative
agencies; rather it provided that the formal hearing provisions would
be triggered by organic agency legislation. The APA also offered
some important procedural innovations, in particular the preferred
category of "informal" rulemaking. 53
The enactment of the APA calmed things down for a while-it was
twenty years before the APA was amended by the addition of the
Freedom of Information Act in 1966. But the APA's four-part
framework of formal and informal adjudication and rulemaking was
beginning to fray. In the world of adjudication, as Paul had already
illuminated, the hard-fought-over formal adjudication procedures in the
APA represented a relatively small proportion of formal adjudication,
49 Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministrative Procedure,78 COLUM. L. REv.

258 (1978).
50 The

bibliography

is

available

at

Bibliography,

ADMIN.

CONF.

U.S.,

http://www.acus.gov/library/bibliography (last visited June 19, 2011).
51 Verkuil, supra note 49, at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted).
52 Id at 272 (quoting the ASS'N OF THE BAR OF N.Y.C., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION, quoted at 86 CONG. REC. 13,943 (1940)

(veto message of the President)).
53 Id at 277.

2432

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:6

and the much larger world of informal adjudication was essentially
ignored by the APA. The Supreme Court too had moved away from the
idea that a hearing required by due process meant a trial-type hearing
(the Goldberg v. Kelly view) to a sliding scale of procedural
requirements based essentially on a cost-benefit balancing analysis (the
Mathews v. Eldridge approach). And on the rulemaking side, although
pure formal (trial-type) rulemaking was fast disappearing, Congress, the
White House, and the courts were all somewhat dissatisfied with the
streamlined notice-and-comment rulemaking process, leading to socalled hybrid rulemaking and additional procedures and analytical
requirements layered onto the section 553 procedures.
In Paul's view the formal and informal poles were converging into
a middle ground "unitary procedure." 54 He suggested that the APA
itself was not a barrier to this approach, pointing out that in section
556(d)'s limitations on the right to cross examination and its written
hearing provisions as well as section 555(e)'s reasons requirement, "the
APA presents opportunities for procedural reform that have been
underutilized or even ignored since its enactment. These latent
opportunities, if realized, could quell, if not rebut, charges of procedural
rigidity and irrelevance." 55 Building on this, he recommended that trialtype procedures should be reserved for "(a) the imposition of a sanction
for past conduct; [or] (b) any other cases where such procedures are
mandated by the [C]onstitution." 56
For all other cases "where a 'hearing' of some kind is normally
contemplated, whether it be labeled rulemaking or adjudication," Paul
suggested: "A unitary 'administrative procedure' should be established
which (a) contains the minimum procedural ingredients of APA
informal rulemaking (notice, written comment, and reasons); and (b)
may be expanded to include oral comment and cross-examination on
specific issues as the agency so determines." 57 He also suggested that
"[a]dministrative decisions shall be accompanied by a concise statement
of reasons, if request therefor is made, unless the agency determines that
for good cause such a requirement should be dispensed with."58
Interestingly, he also proposed that "[b]efore adopting rules of
procedure each agency should consult with [ACUS] in an effort to
achieve such degree of uniformity as is consistent with the varying
54 Id. at 311 ("The emergence of an alternative administrative procedure model allows for
contraction of formal adjudication and is soundly based in related procedural experience, such as
the use of rulemaking in ratemaking. This unitary procedure can effectively resolve most matters
that come before agencies, whether they were formerly labelled [sic] rulemaking or
adjudication.").
55 Id. at 313.
56 Id. at 321 (Recommendation 1).
57 Id. at 322 (Recommendation 2).
58 Id. at 324 (Recommendation 3).
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nature of the work of the agencies." 59 This is an approach that
60
Congress had taken in the 1976 Government in the Sunshine Act, and
that ACUS adopted later with respect to the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 6 1 but it has not been tried more generally.
Paul also recommended that "[t]he Administrative Conference
should conduct 'procedural audits' to evaluate agency performance in a
systematic manner." 62 Given Paul's current position, it is worth quoting
in full his reason for this recommendation:
The Administrative Conference has not performed this role in
any substantial way, but there is no reason (other than budgetary
constraints) why it cannot do so. Indeed, the Conference's ill-fated
ancestor, the proposed Office of Federal Administrative Procedure,
was created with exactly this role in mind. Its major function was to
have been "to examine critically the procedures and practices of the
agencies." This role should be compatible with the current mission
of the Conference. Indeed, when the Conference has undertaken
single agency studies (as with its recent Internal Revenue Service
procedural reform study), it has achieved notable success.
The Conference's organization should pose no serious obstacles
to this new role. The membership consists in large measure of
agency officials, but the additional presence of the chairman's office,
with its professional staff, and respected public members, should
rebut any charges that the agencies are simply doing a friendly audit.
The Conference's organization would have to be expanded or
restructured to allow for committees that would focus on individual
agencies, as its committee structure is presently organized around
generic issues (rulemaking, judicial review, and so forth) rather than
particular agencies.
The procedural audit role can only be performed effectively if the
Conference is given adequate additional funding to do the job. The
agency has the experience, stature, and expertise to look closely at
agency performance and develop auditing standards that can measure
the quality of administrative procedures. These kinds of procedural
studies may be the best way ultimately to fix upon workable
measures of the procedural values of fairness, efficiency, and
satisfaction that can be used to regularize agency procedure in the
future. 63

59 Id. at 326 (Recommendation 7).
60 See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(g) (2006).
61 See id § 504(e) (requiring that ACUS report to Congress annually on claims and fee
awards in administrative cases). While not requiring consultation per se, ACUS did issue "model
rules" for as a basis for consulting with agencies on the implementation of the Act in
administrative cases. See 51 Fed. Reg. 16,659, 16,665-69 (May 6, 1986) (codified at 1 C.F.R. pt.
315).
62 Verkuil, supra note 49, at 328 (Recommendation 9).
63 Id. at 328-29.
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WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT INAGENCY RULEMAKING

Two years after this magnum opus, Paul took on a hot button issue
for ACUS-the increasing importance and controversy concerning
White House "jawboning" of agencies in rulemaking through ex parte
contacts. 64 In 1977, ACUS had issued a careful recommendation on ex

parte communications in rulemaking more generally in response to the
D.C. Circuit's seeming prohibition of them in the Home Box Office
case. 65 In that Recommendation, 66 ACUS declined to support an
across-the-board prohibition on such comments in informal rulemaking,
but urged agencies to promptly place any such comments received after
the notice of proposed rulemaking in the public record. But the
development of increasing White House involvement in the rulemaking
process, evidenced by President Carter's Executive Order 12,04467 and
news reports of White House "confrontations with agency policymakers
over health, safety, and environmental rules" over the costs of such
rules, raised new questions.68
Paul's treatment of the issue is also characteristically measured,
but he ultimately comes down in favor of allowing White House ex
parte contacts in rulemaking (as long as factual submissions were
placed in the record) as an important part of the President's
accountability for "tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." 69 One year after this, during the even more controlling
Administration of Ronald Reagan, 70 Judge Patricia Wald, writing for
the D.C. Circuit, echoed these views in Sierra Club v. Costle,7 with
numerous citations to Paul's article.
6 Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943 (1980), reprinted in ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1980, at 513-59 (1980) and Regulatory Reform Legislation of
1981: Hearingson S. 344 and S. 1080 Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong.,

Ist Sess. 464 (1981).
65 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

66 ACUS Recommendation No. 77-3, Ex parte Communications in Informal Rulemaking
Proceedings, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,251, 54,253 (Oct. 5, 1977).
67 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R.§ 152 (1979).
68 Verkuil, supranote 64, at 944.
69 Id at 952 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 3).
70 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982) (providing for clearance of most
executive agency proposed and final rules by OMB).
71 657 F.2d 298, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The court recognizes the basic need of the President and his White House staff to
monitor the consistency of executive agency regulations with Administration
policy....
The authority of the President to control and supervise executive
policymaking is derived from the Constitution; the desirability of such control is
demonstrable from the practical realities of administrative rulemaking. Regulations
such as those involved here demand a careful weighing of cost, environmental, and
energy considerations. They also have broad implications for national economic
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Paul's article is one of the first to take on this issue--one that
became somewhat more politicized when the Reagan Administration
converted OMB's role into one of clearing rules before they could be
issued, and when the phenomenon of "conduit communications"
between outside groups and OMB became more publicized. But Paul's
article and the ensuing ACUS Recommendation 72 (also quoted in full
by Judge Wald73 ) broadly supported intragovernmental communications
in rulemaking, subject to the caveat that communications that "contain
material factual information (as distinct from indications of
governmental policy) pertaining to or affecting a proposed rule" should
be promptly made public and conduit communications should be
"identified and placed in the public file, regardless of their content." 74
The Recommendation was somewhat heatedly debated in the plenary
session, and it did occasion a separate dissenting statement from some
ACUS members aligned with public interest groups who thought it
allowed too much secret communication between the White House and
the agencies. 75 But it also laid the foundation for ACUS's 1988
of Agency
Review
"Presidential
88-9,
Recommendation
76
Rulemaking," which contained greater detail with respect to the need
for transparency and was largely adopted in President Clinton's
Executive Order 12,866.77
I should add that Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, an ACUS member
who was not shy about skewering a consultant's report he didn't like,
wrote a letter praising this study: "The Verkuil study is a very
impressive one, and I am at least tentatively in agreement with every

policy. Our form of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if
key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief
Executive.
Id.
72 ACUS Recommendation No. 80-6, Intragovernmental Communications in Informal
Rulemaking Proceedings, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,407, 86,408-09 (Dec. 31, 1980).
73 657 F.2d at 407 n.528.
74 ACUS Recommendation No. 80-6, 45 Fed. Reg. at 86,408, 2.
75 See id. at 86,408-09 (separate statement of ACUS members William A. Butler et al.).
76 54 Fed. Reg. 5207, 5207-09 (Feb. 2, 1989).
77 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (Oct. 4, 1993). The Conference recommended
public disclosure of proposed and final agency rules and final agency agendas submitted to OMB,
official written policy guidance from OMB, communications from OMB containing factual
information relating to the substance of the rulemaking, and "conduit" communications (that is,
communications containing the views, positions, or information from persons outside the
government). The recommendation also suggested procedures to be followed by OMB reviewing
officials to discourage such "conduit" communications. Finally, the recommendation stated that
presidential review "should be completed in a timely fashion" by both the reviewing office and
the agencies, "with due regard for statutory and other relevant deadlines," but a specific time limit
on review was not recommended.
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part of his main outline." 78 This is high praise when considering the
source!
V. THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT
Paul stayed in the realm of rulemaking for his next work for
ACUS, taking up the just-enacted Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980,79
which required agencies to pay special attention to their rules' impact
on small business. His "critical guide" to the new law, which was one
of the first efforts to require special analyses in rulemaking, remains to
this day one of the most comprehensive and authoritative overviews of
the Act and its legislative history.80 He rightly saw this as a part of the
burgeoning "regulatory reform" movement, which added many new
requirements to the rulemaking process (and came close to radically
In the end, Paul wrote
transforming the regulatory process).
approvingly of this law:
The RFA is special-interest legislation with a balance: it urges

agencies to recognize differences in size when promulgating rules,
but it does not undermine the agency's regulatory authority derived
from organic legislation. Thus, while the RFA may not be all the
small business community desires, it contains the seeds for
producing workable compromises between government and the

private sector and it does not pose unreasonable burdens on the

administrative process. 8 1
Looking back, what is perhaps most interesting are his comments
on the Act's limitations on judicial review.
The Act originally

precluded any direct review of agency regulatory flexibility analyses or
agency compliance or noncompliance with these requirements, opting
instead to provide that "[w]hen an action for judicial review of a rule is
instituted, any regulatory flexibility analysis for such rule shall
constitute part of the whole record of agency action in connection with
the review." 82 Paul's comment on this "non-reviewability" provision is
that

78 Letter from Kenneth Culp Davis to Richard K. Berg, ACUS Exec. Sec'y (Nov. 3, 1980)
(on file in closed project file for Recommendation 80-6).
79 Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612
(2006)).
80 Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213,
reprintedin ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTs 1981, at 203302 (1981).
81 Id. at 271.

82 5 U.S.C. § 611(b) (1980), amended by Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847.
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[i]n effect, Congress subordinated the value of compliance induced
by judicial oversight to the values of administrative efficiency and
uninterrupted decisionmaking. Even though the non-reviewability of
the certification process may frustrate the [Act's] purpose, Congress
chose to take this risk rather than embroil the process in the
quagmire of litigation.83
In 1996, Congress changed its mind and amended the Act to provide for
broad judicial review. 84 Whether this change unduly altered the balance
against administrative efficiency is a topic for a future study.
VI.

CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

A year later, the indefatigable Dean Verkuil provided another
report for the Conference that led to a recommendation-this time on
the knotty problem of congressional limitations on judicial review of
rules.8 s
One of the interesting developments of the 1970s was the
enactment of numerous environmental statutes that contained time
limits on seeking review of rules coupled with preclusion of
enforcement review if the pre-enforcement time limits were missed. It
was only in 1966 that the Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories86 had
legitimated pre-enforcement review of rules, and now Congress was
increasingly trying to make it exclusive. Though these statutes were
worded broadly and seemed to admit of no exceptions, courts were
beginning to carve out exceptions for enforcement review in some types
of cases (e.g., criminal enforcement cases) and some types of claims
(e.g., constitutional claims). But what was the best approach for the
courts and Congress to take? The Conference had previously hired
another consultant to categorize the existing preclusion statutes, but that
was a purely descriptive study.87 Paul volunteered to add prescription
to the description.88 And the Conference accepted his guidance in
Recommendation 82-7, "Judicial Review of Rules in Enforcement

83 Verkuil, supra note 80, at 260.
84 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
Stat. 857, 865-66 (1996) (substituting new § 611 of Title 5, U.S.C.).

§ 242, 110

85 Paul R. Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TUL. L. REV.

733 (1983), reprinted in 2 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND
REPORTS 1982, at 443-85 (1982).
86 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see also supra text accompanying note 5.
87 Frederick Davis, Judicial Review of Rulemaking: New Patterns and New Problems, 1981
DUKE L.J. 279.
88 Letter from Paul R. Verkuil to William H. Allen, Chairman of the ACUS Judicial Review
Comm. (Aug. 17, 1981) (on file in the closed project file for Recommendation 82-7) (critiquing
the descriptive report as leaving much "undone," and offering his help to the committee).
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Proceedings." 89 The result was a carefully balanced and useful set of
pointers for the courts and Congress that I believe has stood the test of
time very well, as Professor Levin has remarked today. 90 The heart of
the Recommendation provides:
When Congress decides to limit the availability of judicial review of
rules at the enforcement stage, it should ordinarily preclude review
only of issues relating to procedures employed in the rulemaking or
the adequacy of factual support for the rule in the administrative
record. Judicial review of issues relating to the constitutional basis
for the rule or the application of the rule to a particular respondent or
defendant should be permitted when these issues are raised in
subsequent suits or as defenses to subsequent enforcement actions
(subject to the principles of collateral estoppel and stare decisis).
Judicial review of issues relating to the statutory authority for the
rule should be precluded at the enforcement stage only where
Congress has concluded that there is a compelling need to achieve
prompt compliance with the rule on a national or industry-wide
basis. 9 1
This was not an easy study to undertake, and it is one where Paul
actually received some rather critical comments on his first draft,
including from Conference founder Walter Gellhorn. 92 But Paul made
the fixes, graciously acknowledged Professor Gellhom and Conference
staff members who also critiqued his draft, 93 and produced a well
received final report that did the job.

VII.

IMMIGRATION AND DUE PROCESS

Paul shifted gears for his next report-perhaps recalling his advice
that ACUS should conduct procedural audits, and calling on his
experience examining due process in informal adjudication, he took on
what he himself called a "procedural audit that determines which
procedural ingredients are provided in each immigration function." 94
The timing of this effort was propitious because it was undertaken as

89 47 Fed. Reg. 58,207, 58,208-10 (Dec. 30, 1982).
90 Ronald M. Levin, Statutory Time Limits on JudicialReview ofRules: Verkuil Revisited, 32
CARDOZO L. REv. 2203 (2011).

91 47 Fed. Reg. at 58,210, T 2.
92 Letter from Walter Gellhorn to Paul R. Verkuil 3 (Aug. 4, 1982) (on file in the closed
project file for Recommendation 82-7) ("You may ... regard me as a book reviewer who, in
place of reviewing a volume, describes the volume he wishes has been written instead.").
93 Verkuil, supra note 85, at 733 n.aa.
94 Paul R. Verkuil, A Study ofImmigration Procedures,31 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1145 (1984)
(internal quotation marks omitted), reprinted in ADMIN.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1984, at 991 (1984).

CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
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the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,95 containing new
legalization, employer sanctions, and summary asylum procedures, was
being considered. In this article, Paul usefully categorized the six thenexisting immigration functions (denaturalization, deportation, asylum,
exclusion, parole/detention, and discretionary decisions). He also
assessed the decision-making procedures for the legalization and
employer sanction provisions that were being proposed at the time.
Of course, later legislation and executive reorganization have
changed the landscape of our immigration programs quite extensively,
so the specifics of Paul's analysis may be dated. But the fundamental
approach of tailoring procedures to the needs of fairness and efficiency
has not changed. I was recently talking to an immigration law expert
(who shall remain nameless) who told me that s/he had read Paul's
article at the time and was quite impressed that as a "non-immigration
person" he had gotten it "almost all right." Given the notorious
complexity of the immigration laws, that is also pretty high praise.
Moreover, it is hard not to credit Paul for the perspicacity of his
conclusion:
There can be no doubt that immigration law has been moved to
center stage. It will not relinquish that position in the future, no
matter what Congress does with the current ... proposals. The
problems those bills address are not going away. Our society must
plan for increasing pressures upon our borders from those throughout
the world who seek to improve their lives. The pressures to
assimilate both legal and illegal aliens will continue to present major
social and administrative problems.
The courts' role in supervising appropriate INS procedures is
likely to expand. While it is not yet clear how much judicial
supervision will do to change existing procedures for deciding
immigration cases, it seems inevitable that constant contact, through
habeas corpus petitions as well as ordinary judicial review, will bring
the courts closer to the process. In these circumstances, one can
expect procedural improvements to occur by administrative initiative
also. Fortunately, the level of recommended changes is within the
capacity of the INS and the Department of Justice to achieve. 96
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has since been
renamed and absorbed by the Department of Homeland Security, but
It remains an area of
otherwise Paul's comments are spot-on.
administrative procedure that is in great need of such analysis.
It will be obvious by now that Paul was an invaluable ACUS
consultant. From 1974 to 1984, he took on six ACUS projects plus
another major report that made recommendations to ACUS. According

95 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
96 Verkuil, supra note 94, at 1206-07.
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to the list of his publications distributed for this program, he also
published thirteen other articles and three books during this period!
How he was able to do this while serving as a law school dean for many
of these years is beyond me. But there was one more major ACUS
study to come. When he finished it, perhaps he thought of it as the
culmination of his ACUS career. It is an underappreciated work, so
much so that it almost became ACUS's coup de grace.
VIII.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY

In 1991, ACUS received a request from the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) to undertake a broad examination of the current
and future role of administrative law judges (ALJs) in the administrative
process. The OPM Director requested that the Conference include in its
study "a clear delineation of the current 'landscape' of administrative
adjudication [and] an analysis of the evolving role of the ALJ and other
agency adjudicators from 1946 to the present." 97 The subject of ALJs
was something I had been interested in for some time, 98 so I was happy
when Paul agreed to lead a team of scholars including Daniel Gifford,
Charles Koch, and Richard Pierce to undertake this effort, and when he
invited me to be a team member. (I like to tell my administrative law
students I was one of the "et al.s" for this report, which is excerpted in
the casebook I use.99)

This august team prepared a 368-page book complete with an
empirical survey and an extensive bibliography.100 It spun off several
law review articles 01 and produced a detailed ACUS

97 Paul R. Verkuil et al., The FederalAdministrative Judiciary, in 2 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1992, at 779 (1992) (citing Memorandum from
Constance Berry Newman, Director of OPM, to Heads of Departments and Agencies Employing
ALJs (July 9, 1991)).
98 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the
Trees, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 388 (1984); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, FederalAdministrative Law Judges:
A Focus on our Invisible Judiciary,33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109 (1981); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified
Corps ofALJs: A Proposalto Test the Idea at the FederalLevel, 65 JUDICATURE 266 (1981).
99 See MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 130-37 (3d ed. 2009).
100 Verkuil et al., supra note 97. Unfortunately, the volume is out of print and somewhat hard
It is, however, available on HeinOnline, as are all the ACUS reports and
to find.
recommendations from 1968-1995.
101 See Daniel J. Gifford, FederalAdministrative Law Judges: The Relevance ofPast Choices
to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 1 (1997); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative
Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271 (1994); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal
Administrative Judiciary: Establishing an Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for
ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 589 (1994); Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal
Administrative Judiciary,39 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1992).
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Recommendation.1 02 It remains the only publication that I know of that
gives comprehensive treatment to both ALJs and non-ALJ adjudicators.
It traces the history of the evolution of the hearing examiner position
into ALJs, and the transformation of their workload from one of largely
regulatory cases to one of largely benefit cases. It outlined some of the
problems in the selection process, designed to be one of the true merit
selection judicial selection processes in the nation, but suffering from
agency dissatisfaction and a lack of diversity among the judge corps. It
discussed the variety of administrative adjudications and adjudicators
across the government. Finally, it discussed the scope and degree of
independence for ALJs and non-ALJs, and how there were obvious
advantages of independence and not-so-obvious potential adverse
consequences of independence in some contexts. An extensive survey
of ALJs and non-ALJs bolstered these conclusions.
This is not the forum to go into the details of this report or the
ACUS recommendation, other than to say that they both, to varying
degrees, recommended a fairly significant shakeup of the existing AU
program, especially in giving the agencies more flexibility in selecting
ALJs from OPM's register of eligible applicants, and in allowing some
evaluation of AU performance by Chief ALJs. Along the way, the
Conference also mildly threw some cold water on the idea of thenpending proposals to establish a centralized corps of ALJs, thus
divorcing them from their employing agencies.
These recommendations did not sit well with certain members of
the AU community-especially those that were pushing the centralized
corps proposal. With a change in OPM leadership and some vocal
opponents among ALJs, the ACUS recommendations died on the vine.
Afterwards, several outspoken opponents bitterly criticized ACUS in
correspondence with Congress, while other ALJs strongly defended the
agency.103 An objective observer who wrote a post-mortem on ACUS
found that there was at least some evidence that this campaign on the
part of some ALJs to discredit ACUS, aided by a hired lobbyist, had
some impact on its ultimate defunding.104
This is ironic since the recommendations were frankly intended to
save ALJs from becoming an endangered species outside of the Social
Security Administration (SSA), which in 1992 had 73% and in 2008
had 83% of all ALJs in the government.105 Indeed, the increasing
102 ACUS Recommendation No. 92-7, The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 57 Fed. Reg.
61,759, 61,760-65 (Dec. 29, 1992).
103 See Toni M. Fine, A Legislative Analysis of the Demise of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 19, 58-61 (1998).
104 Id. at 95-97.
105 As of September 2008, SSA employed 1192 out of 1436 ALJs, or 83%. See U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTS-ORIENTED CULTURES: OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING
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number of non-ALJ adjudicators far outstrips the approximately 250
ALJs found in all the agencies other than the SSA. 0 6 ACUS itself
bemoaned this movement away from ALJs:
The Conference's general view is that the movement away from the
uniformity of qualifications, procedures, and protections of
independence that derives from using ALJs in appropriate
adjudications is unfortunate. The Conference believes that, to some
extent, this movement away from ALJs toward AJs has been fueled
by perceptions among agency management of difficulties in selecting
and managing ALJs. These recommendations attempt to address
these perceived problems. 0 7
The Government
At any rate, the problem continues.
Accountability Office (GAO) has recently issued another report
suggesting continued agency dissatisfaction with the program. 0 8 ALJ
organizations have welcomed ACUS back, if for no other reason than
that adjudication issues will get renewed consideration. So I hope that
the volume that Paul organized and put together, The Federal
Administrative Judiciary,will get the attention and respect that it (in my
not unbiased opinion) deserves.

CONCLUSION

When I embarked on this journey through Paul Verkuil's ACUSrelated scholarship, I did not really know exactly what I was getting
into. I came out of it highly impressed with the sheer amount of work
he did for the Conference (without even considering all his other work
But more
both during and after the Conference's operations).
importantly, I was impressed with its quality. To me it adds up to a
microcosm of ACUS's work as a whole, providing pragmatic and
theoretically sound improvements in the core of administrative
procedure-adjudication, rulemaking, and judicial review-while also
branching out into important specialized areas-social security,
immigration, small business impacts, and independent agency structure.

AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 12-13 (2010). In May 1992, it was 866 out of 1185 (73%).
Verkuil et al., supra note 97, at 1063 app. I.
106 See RAYMOND LIMON, OFFICE OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDICIARY THEN AND NOW-A DECADE OF CHANGE 1992-2002, at 3 (Dec. 23, 2002) (authored
by Raymond Limon, Acting Deputy Assistant Director) (finding that the number of non-ALJ
presiding officials had increased from 2692 in 1992 to 3370 in 2002 and citing John Frye, Study
ofNon-ALI HearingPrograms,44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992)).
107 ACUS Recommendation No. 92-7, 57 Fed. Reg. at 61,760 (preamble). I have made this
point more strenuously in Lubbers, supra note 42.
108 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 105, at 9-11.
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He was a one-man ACUS within ACUS, so it is appropriate that he now
has a chance to lead the agency in its second life.

